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In the postwar era, US-Japan economic relations have been characterized by substantial tensions, 
yet this has not damaged the underlying security relationship or critically harmed the multilateral 
economic framework. In fact, these two economies have become more integrated over time even 
as these tensions played out. These tensions, however, have required an enormous expenditure of 
political capital and officials’ time on both sides of the Pacific and have led to foregone 
opportunities for institution building and policy coordination.
1 They have deepened since Japan 
“caught up” with the United States around 1980, and Japanese and US firms began increasingly 
to compete for profits and market share in the same sectors. Moreover, as both the US and 
Japanese economies continue to mature – both in terms of the age of their populations and their 
industrial mix – they will likely face even greater tensions between them over allocating the 
management and costs of industrial adjustment. 
Financial liberalization and integration could change all this. At present, US and Japanese 
corporate governance and investment behavior appear to be converging towards the arms-length, 
market-based, US approach to financial markets. If this trend continues, it will not only reduce 
tensions in the near term by facilitating the resolution of specific disputes, but it could also forge 
common interests between domestic interest groups across the Pacific while giving those groups 
more power relative to their respective governments. Over the longer-term, convergence would 
also produce common US and Japanese policy goals in relation to international capital flows and 
investment. Finally, for a transitional period, convergence should simultaneously increase US 
influence and improve Japanese economic performance, a combination that has been difficult to 
attain since the first oil shock. 
Convergence between the US and Japanese financial systems, however, is not a foregone 
conclusion. The general question of whether the decline of national models is inevitable remains 
open
2—and the specific outcome of the interaction between Japanese political economy (arguably 
the most distinctive among industrial democracies) and financial liberalization (arguably the most 
                                                            
1. In the language of the introduction to this volume, the general picture is one of tension (instead of 
harmony), but more cooperation than conflict in terms of results, although there were mutual gains missed. 
2. Suzanne Berger, “Introduction,” in Suzanne Berger and Ronald Dore, eds., National Diversity and 
Global Capitalism (Cornell University Press, 1996), notes (skeptically) that convergence might occur 
because of economic opportunism and competitive deregulation, open borders and markets, belief in liberal 
ideas, or direct international pressures on countries and domestic demands. See also Adam S. Posen, 
Restoring Japan’s Economic Growth (Institute for International Economics, 1998), chapter 6, for a 
different set of arguments why “national models” will fail to converge overall.   3
transformative aspect of globalization) already is unfolding as a critical case study.
3 Even if most 
would agree that some form of liberalization has taken place in Japanese as well as American 
financial markets, scholars disagree over whether the Japanese form of liberalization is distinct 
from the American, whether this liberalization is likely to be the victim of political backlash (in 
either country), or whether financial sector change is likely to transform the rest of Japan’s 
economy. 
This essay is focused on a related but more policy-oriented question: If we assume that 
the current trends toward liberalization in and convergence between the United States and 
Japanese financial system persist, how will this affect US-Japan relations? I will present evidence 
of convergence toward the increasingly deregulated US system over the past 15 years, and I will 
argue that this trend is likely to persist and probably accelerate. I assume as well that the case 
need not be made here on the pure economics why the more liberal model is likely to confer 
efficiency gains (at least in the short-run). I do not presume that the ongoing academic discussion 
of globalization and its effects has been settled. For purposes of policymaking, however, if this 
convergence assumption proves incorrect in the coming years, it almost certainly would mean 
that financial factors would be only a very minor factor in US-Japan relations (as it was until 
recently), or simply one of many sectoral disputes with dynamics with which we are familiar, 
having no special implications. Several hundred billion dollars have already been bet by Japanese 
and American investors on the belief that financial liberalization and convergence will occur, so it 
seems worth exploring the implications of this, I would argue, likely possibility. 
The impact of financial convergence on US-Japan relations has been limited to date. 
Despite the breathless rhetoric about globalization, the concern with which some observers 
viewed the growth in Japanese holdings of US government debt, and the incidence of severe 
banking system problems in both countries, neither government has been able to extract much in 
the way of leverage over the other from financial sector developments. This may not come as a 
surprise to most observers, but it is worth documenting. I will argue, however, that many of the 
key deregulatory measures have only taken effect in Japan since the response to the 1997-98 
recession, and that those, combined with the looming financial crisis awaiting Japan’s 
undercapitalized banking system
4 will change matters.  
                                                            
3. See Frances McCall Rosenbluth, Financial Politics in Contemporary Japan (Cornell University Press, 
1989), and Steven Vogel, Freer Markets, More Rules: Regulatory Reforms in Advanced Industrial 
Countries (Cornell University Press, 1996), for two somewhat opposing interpretations that agree this is a 
test case for globalization and for its effect on domestic political economy. 
4. Adam S. Posen, “Japan 2001 – Decisive Action or Financial Panic,” Policy Brief 01-4 (Institute for 
International Economics, 2001), explains why the banking system is likely to have an overt crisis in Japan 
in Fall 2001, though partial policy responses in the past have averted or delayed such an outcome.   4
Specifically, American FDI into and influence upon the Japanese financial sector is likely 
to mount in the coming years, and this will reinforce American “soft power” over the ideas 
driving international financial arrangements. This combination of financial flows and ideational 
factors has already radically shifted the setting of the US-Japan trade agenda, the willingness of 
both governments to engage in exchange rate intervention. While a future political backlash may 
raise tensions, the underlying economic forces will drive the United States and Japan into closer 
cooperation in terms of results on financial issues.
5  
These financial developments are unlikely to have much direct impact on US-Japan 
security relations, but they are likely to exemplify and feed many of the themes about the broader 
relationship identified in this project: economic issues growing less contentious between the two 
countries; military power becoming less important as a factor in determining bargaining power 
between the United States and Japan,
6 and non-governmental actors and international 
organizations continuing to increase their role in the relationship at the expense of the two states. 
 
1.  THE COURSE OF FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION SO FAR IN THE UNITED 
STATES AND JAPAN  
 
For this chapter, the independent variable influencing the US-Japan relationship is finance, both 
the state of finance within the two countries as well as financial flows between them. The source 
of variation is the long slow process of deregulation, first in the United States, second and more 
slowly in Japan. Up until 1980, there was little change of import on this front in either country. 
The size and turnover of international capital flows only significantly expanded beyond that 
necessary for trade in the mid-1980s.  
Accordingly, this section gives a brief history of domestic financial deregulation and 
response in the United States and in Japan, and then an overview of the development of 
transpacific capital flows, emphasizing the last 15-20 years.  Underlying developments in both 
countries are four facts: First, both financial systems started out with strict regulations separating 
banking and securities activities; second, both systems started out with limits on the returns that 
could be paid depositors and the vast majority of domestic savings in bank accounts; third, both 
systems faced fundamentally unprofitable banking systems once these barriers began to erode; 
and fourth, both systems suffered through banking crises caused by financial firms’ reaction to 
partial deregulation and lax supervision. Even when we speak of “convergence,” thereby 
                                                            
5. Schoppa’s chapter illustrates how greater tensions in domestic politics over the Japanese or American 
government’s stance on a given issue can still lead to increased cooperation as a result. 
6. Though, in this issue area, financial developments still leave the United States relatively advantaged 
versus Japan.   5
acknowledging a gap between national forms of both corporate finance and savings behavior and 
regulatory practices, we should not lose sight of these basic similarities. It is these similarities, 
arising out of the economic logic of what financial systems can and cannot do that gives rise to 
the convergence. 
 
1A. The United States 
The United States financial system was characterized by decentralization of both financial 
institutions and regulators, with additional divisions between types of financial firms and between 
states’ rules.
7 The response to the 1929 stock market crash and the Great Depression had led to 
the creation of many legal barriers between firms, most notably the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 
preventing both interstate banking and the conduct of investment and commercial banking under 
one roof. Additionally, the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 plugged any holes in Glass-
Steagall’s rules preventing commercial banks from holding stock in nonfinancial firms. Interest 
rates paid on individual’s deposit accounts were limited by Regulation Q. The S&Ls were 
required to invest only in long-term housing loans, and therefore were limited in their risk-taking 
and profit making, but received the right to offer a little more to their depositors in recompense. 
The Securities and Exchange Commission was one of several regulators of financial markets, 
including state-level regulators who controlled both the life and casualty insurance industries (and 
still do). 
Deregulation began in earnest with the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act, 
effective September 1983. This act legalized interest-paying deposit accounts and money-market 
funds, products already well under way as the inflation of the 1970s had made Regulation Q 
interest rate limits untenable and the use of certificates of deposit (CDs) had been deregulated by 
1973. Garn-St. Germain also removed all statutory limits on real estate lending, opening up the 
S&Ls’ mortgage market to competition but in return allowing the S&Ls to engage in commercial 
and consumer lending. Unfortunately, this regulatory pandering—giving each piece of the 
banking sector something—rather than encouraging exit of some banks sowed the seeds of what 
became the S&L crisis. Losing their traditional high-margin business, and presented with the 
opportunities to make loans in areas where they were unprepared to evaluate credit risks, the 
S&Ls ramped up real estate lending as part of an early 1980s boom. Commercial banks also 
shifted into lending to small and medium enterprises collateralized by land as they lost their best 
clients to the rise of commercial paper (CP) as a low-cost short-term financing option.   6
Meanwhile, more depositors switched their assets into money market funds (MMFs), CDs, and 
mutual funds, which made banks and S&Ls have to compete harder for loanable funds. 
The collapse of the market for real estate in the mid-1980s cut directly into the capital of 
most S&Ls and many banks. As a measure of the change in real estate prices, Friedman
8 notes 
that the vacancy rate for commercial offices was 4 percent at the height of a recession in 1980, 
but 18 percent despite a recovery by 1986. The affected banks and S&Ls behaved just as 
economic theory would predict: until supervisors enforced matters, they invested in higher 
risk/high return projects in hopes of restoring their capital, they rolled over outstanding bad loans 
to avoid writing them down, and they stopped lending to high quality borrowers with safe low 
returns. These financial firms also rapidly escalated deposit interest rates, figuring that any losses 
would be covered by deposit insurance. 
US supervisors unfortunately did some gambling on resurrection of their own, waiting to 
shut down banks and S&Ls with insufficient capital in hopes that better economic times would 
allow them to recoup their losses. This only allowed the problem to grow until it was necessary 
for large-scale government action to consolidate, recapitalize, and/or close failed institutions, and 
to begin selling off foreclosed real estate assets.
9 In August 1987, the Competitive Equality 
Banking Act put $11 billion into recapitalizing the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance 
Corporation, but this ended up being just the start of what became an estimated $159 billion hit 
(about 3 percent of a year’s US GDP) to taxpayers for cleaning up the mess with final legislation 
coming only in 1993.  
One positive outcome of this sequence was an increase in the sophistication of US savers, 
including a rising awareness that the limits per account on deposit insurance really would be 
upheld, and might come into play, as well as a greater appreciation for risk and for self-allocation 
of funds. As can be seen in figure 1, the allocation of US household wealth has shifted 
significantly over this period. The share of transaction accounts and other once standard bank 
accounts has steadily declined, and even CDs are held by half as many savers as at their height. 
Retirement accounts, mutual funds, and individual equity ownership have risen to compensate, as 
life insurance’s share in savings has remained stable. The rise in share of the equity portion 
                                                                                                                                                                             
7. Benjamin Friedman, “Japan Now and the United States Then: Lessons from the Parallels,” in Ryoichi 
Mikitani and Adam S. Posen, eds., Japan’s Financial Crisis and Its Parallels to US Experience (Institute 
for International Economics, 2000). 
8. Friedman, “Japan Now and the United States Then.” 
9. Robert Glauber and Anil Kashyap, “Discussions of the Financial Crisis,” in Ryoichi Mikitani and Adam 
S. Posen, eds., Japan’s Financial Crisis and Its Parallels to the US Experience (Institute for International 
Economics, 2000).   7
appears to be less than one-for-one with the run-up in the US equity market of 1994-2000, again 
indicating a healthy sense of discounting by American savers. 
On the corporate finance side, a similar process was underway.  After CP became 
standard for the largest American corporations, displacing short-term bank loans, the high-yield 
(junk) bond market grew to provide securitized financing for riskier businesses. The minimum 
size for American companies to go directly to the markets for financing, either to issue a bond or 
to go public with an equity issue, declined throughout the period. This gave rise to the growth in 
the volume of the NASDAQ and to lower demand for long-term bank lending. To manage their 
risks, as well as to offer differentiated products, American financial firms including banks began 
to create derivative securities and to securitize an increasing share of loans. Investors and 
borrowers could go directly to financial markets for lower costs of intermediation, or even 
without intermediation, to an unprecedented degree. 
The United States’ reactive approach to financial deregulation extended beyond the 
response to the S&L crises. The largest commercial banks slowly took on more capabilities by 
sending petitions to the Federal Reserve, as, in an early example, Bankers’ Trust did by engaging 
in some investment banking activities. Bank holding companies were allowed to merge across 
state lines or acquire out of state banks, as recognized in the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and 
Branching Efficiency Act of September 1995 (taking effect in June 1997). Throughout the 1990s, 
financial innovations including derivatives in November 1999, after two decades of lobbying, 
Congress passed the Graham-Leach-Billey Act, effectively repealing Glass-Steagall and the 1956 
Bank Holding Company Act. The expected effect is the emergence of a number of financial 
“supermarkets,” like Travelers/Citibank/Salomon Smith Barney, offering a complete range of 
services. Some critics remain concerned that the risks to financial stability that Glass-Steagall was 
meant to prevent will reappear. The Federal Reserve has announced that it has moved to the use 
of bank-reported Value-At-Risk (VAR) models to assess the soundness of banks’ portfolios, 
instead of examining the portfolios themselves, in what it deems a necessary response to the 
complexity of banks’ diversification and securitization. The question is open whether such self-
regulation will be effective. US banks are still prohibited from having shares in nonfinancial 
companies directly on their balance sheets, though they now may be held by other parts of their 
holding companies. 
 
1B. Japan    8
The Japanese financial system traditionally featured indirect financing of industry, with a 
concentrated banking sector and underdeveloped capital markets.
10 As in the United States, there 
was compartmentalization between securities and banking activities, because the postwar 
occupying authorities imposed a law modeled on Glass-Steagall.
11 The banks had competition for 
depositors from the Postal Savings System, which doubled in size over the last 50 years, and now 
takes in two-thirds as many deposits as the entire private banking sector. Since Postal Savings 
funds were made available to the government for use in the Fiscal Investment and Loan Program, 
and since the Postal Savings system was regulated by the Ministry of Posts and 
Telecommunications in de jure cooperation (de facto competition) with the Ministry of Finance 
(MOF), it offered a slightly higher rate of interest as well as an implicitly superior government 
guarantee. Also, like the United States, all interest rates on deposits were regulated, but they were 
capped at much lower levels relative to lending rates and to returns on capital, as a conscious 
effort to subsidize investment.  
There were strong limits on corporate finance in return for the lower cost of funds. Much 
of capital was administratively allocated by MOF, MITI, and other agencies, through the banks, 
because demand exceeded supply.
12 Only NTT, the telephone monopoly, Japanese National 
Railways (government owned), and electric utilities were encouraged to issue corporate bonds. 
All other private firms had to put up private collateral with a trust bank and then pay a securities 
firm for the privilege of selling a bond. The long-term credit banks provided most of the long-
term lending for industry. Unlike in the United States, where the separation between banking and 
securities businesses arguably was a spur to financial innovation, in Japan financial innovation 
was limited by the MOF.  
The MOF’s view of financial stability meant controlling exit as well as entry to the 
financial market, and in so doing the regulators took a limited view of disclosure in their 
perceived interest(s) of stability.
13 Steil and Vogel
14 paint very similar views of MOF regulators 
as proud of their power and prestige, protective of the firms under their supervision, even more 
                                                            
10. See Shijuro Ogata, “Financial Markets in Japan,” in Suzanne Berger and Ronald Dore, eds., National 
Diversity and Global Capitalism (Cornell University Press, 1996). Takeo Hoshi and Anil Kashyap, 
Corporate Financing and Governance in Japan: The Road to the Future (Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology Press, 2001), give a provocative historical argument that many of these attributes, and the 
whole keiretsu-Main Bank system in Japan, was a recent partly American creation. 
11. Benn Steil, Illusions of Liberalization: Securities Regulation in Japan and the EC (London: Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, 1995). 
12. Vogel, Freer Markets, More Rules. 
13. Friedman, “Japan Now and the United States Then”, p. 41, notes that until 1995, on the official records, 
no Japanese bank had an operating loss, a patently unbelievable situation. 
14. Steil, Illusions of Liberalization, and Vogel, Freer Markets, More Rules. 
   9
protective of their administrative discretion, and clearly associating market competition with 
unnecessary risk. As one example of this view, deposit insurance was kept informal, without any 
specified limits, because the real objective was not to ever have any banks fail, so no deterrent 
effect on savers was desired.  
Yet the same economic forces working on US banks and securities houses were also 
increasing competitive pressures on the Japanese financial system. As Ogata
15 notes, since the 
mid-1960s, there were growing private capital markets worldwide, growing Japanese government 
bond markets, diversification of the savings instruments available to savers, gradual erosion of 
compartmentalization, and then phased deregulation of interest rates paid depositors starting in 
1985. Japan’s persistent balance of payments surplus made capital controls less relevant, forcing 
banks to make their own decisions on credit allocation. By the mid-1980s, the same process that 
had hit the American S&Ls and small banks had begun in Japan. Japan’s small banks were at 
least as ill-prepared to adapt their credit assessment as their US counterparts, and they had even 
fewer options for shrinking or changing their business lines. 
The best Japanese non-financial firms were going directly to capital markets, whether at 
home or abroad, and were driving down margins on banks’ lending and demanding cheaper 
capital. The CP market, for example was created in 1988, when 2.2 trillion yen were issued in the 
first year, before going on to average around 9 trillion yen a year in the 1990s.
16 In 1989 and 
1990, literally no domestic yen bonds were issued by any firms other than NTT or electric 
utilities, because all corporate borrowers had gone to the euroyen markets. Banks were also 
getting squeezed on the deposit side, at least in terms of interest rates. In 1985-86, 150 trillion yen 
went into high yielding 10-year time deposit accounts at Postal Savings (instead of banks).  
So, just as their American counterparts did, Japanese banks ramped up lending to small- 
and medium-enterprises on the basis of real estate collateral, feeding into a property boom. As 
Shimizu
17 carefully documents, up until 1983, total lending to all SMEs in Japan was about 
equivalent to the total lending to large firms. SME lending then began to rise for the remainder of 
the decade, reaching a level three times that of lending to larger firms by 1990. With MOF 
committed to no exit from the financial markets and banks still holding a large amount of 
(decreasing margin) loanable funds, banks had to chase new areas for lending. The three long-
                                                            
15. Ogata, “Financial Markets in Japan.” 
16. Steil, Illusions of Liberalization. 
17. Yoshinori Shimizu, “Convoy Regulation, Bank Management, and the Financial Crisis in Japan,” in 
Ryoichi Mikitani and Adam S. Posen, eds., Japan’s Financial Crisis and Its Parallels to US Experience 
(Institute for International Economics, 2000).   10
term credit banks made the biggest shift in lending toward SMEs and real estate since they had 
the sharpest fall off in loan demand.  
The collapse of the Japanese stock market in 1990 and again in 1992, followed by steady 
declines in land prices, triggered the financial crisis with which Japan is still coping today. 
Underlying it, however, was the inherent problem of partially deregulating financial markets, 
neither allowing banks to change their business lines or to close, while their old margins and their 
old methods of credit evaluation eroded. MOF bank supervisors waited to close banks in hopes 
that a pick-up in the economy would bail them out. Japanese bank regulators still believed that 
stability was defined as no failures.  Meanwhile, Japanese banks responding to the moral hazard 
of having too little capital and too much deposit insurance rolled over outstanding bad loans 
rather than writing them off and continued to lend on real estate well into the 1990s.  
The jusen, the real estate lending companies owned by consortia of banks to handle 
small-scale mortgages, were the first to visibly collapse under the cycle of bad loans, depreciating 
collateral values, and credit contraction feeding further local SME business collapses and bad 
loans. MOF inspectors admitted in 1991 that 40 percent of their outstanding loans were non-
performing, but gave the jusen a 10-year regulatory window to deal with the problem. Four years 
later in 1995, the share of non-performing loans on the jusen’s only slightly smaller balance 
sheets had risen to 75 percent. Cargill, Hutchison, and Ito put it very well: 
 
The resolution of the jusen industry [in 1995] was fundamentally flawed and illustrated to 
the market the [Japanese] government’s unwillingness to objectively assess and manage 
the financial crisis. It illustrated that the convoy system was still operational by imposing 
the greater part of the resolution burden on the banking system...The intense public 
negative reaction to the small amount of taxpayer funding included in the plan gave the 
regulatory authorities the rationale to continue a policy of forgiveness and 
forbearance...As a result, the government became very reluctant to propose the use of 
public funds to resolve the financial distress. This reluctance to use public funds further 
delayed resolution of the non-performing loan problem and thereby substantially 
increased the ultimate resolution costs.
18 
 
The difference between the American and Japanese regulators’ initial response was only in 
degree, not in kind,
19 but the difference in degree was enormous. American regulators, with 
prompting from legislators, tackled their S&L problem within five years of beginning and at a 
cost of 3 percent of GDP, and the problem was limited to some regions and types of banks. Japan, 
                                                            
18. Thomas Cargill, Michael Hutchison, and Taka Ito, Financial Policy and Central Banking in Japan 
(Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 2000),  53.   11
by contrast, is now into its eleventh year of system-wide financial fragility, and the expected cost 
to the taxpayer is on the order of 100 trillion yen or 20 percent of a year’s GDP. Between the 
surprise failures in Fall 1997 of Yamaichi Securities, the number four Japanese securities firm, 
and Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, a major regional bank on the north island, and the passage of a 
package of bank reform legislation a year later, Japan teetered on the edge of outright financial 
crisis.
20  
With the coming of the government of Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi in July 1998, 
following an LDP election setback in an upper house election, some real financial reforms were 
put in place. In a bill passed in October 1998, the government began to address recapitalization of 
the Japanese banking system with public funds. In addition to a new commitment to stricter 
supervision (see below), the government arranged for all but one of the largest banks, and most of 
the second tier banks, to take strictly conditional capital injections by 1 April 1999, based on new 
balance sheet inspections. The Japanese government received in return preferred shares that 
would allow the regulators to take over the bank or vote out management if the mandated capital 
adequacy ratio was not met. The trend of financial disintermediation in Japan was stopped and 
partially reversed as a result.  
The MOF, now very much discredited with the electorate, was held accountable for 
mismanagement as a bank supervisor. In June 1998, the ministry was reorganized, and the 
Financial Supervision Agency was spun off with responsibility for the banking system. Within 
the MOF, the banking and securities bureaus were combined into a “Financial Planning 
Bureau”.
21 Combined with the granting of independence from the MOF to the Bank of Japan, 
effective February 1998, the MOF became a shadow of its former self. Nevertheless, the Japanese 
tendency towards centralized regulation remained, and the FSA became the Financial Services 
Agency in 2000 with the addition of the securities industry to its portfolio and the movement of 
the Financial Planning Bureau to it from MOF. The nationalizations of the bankrupt Long-Term 
Credit Bank and Nippon Credit Bank in fall 1998 demonstrated the new FSA’s resolve. 
As in the United States, much of the Japanese securities deregulation proceeded down an 
independent track, neither impeded nor hurried by the country’s banking crisis. Steil
22 offers 
                                                                                                                                                                             
19. What is interesting and frustrating, naturally, is that Japanese regulators appeared to learn nothing from 
the mistakes made in the United States, despite explicit attempts to communicate those. I return to this 
point in the next section. 
20. Posen, Restoring Japan’s Economic Growth, chapter 4, describes the situation and its dynamics at the 
time. 
21. Jennifer Holt Dwyer, “US-Japan Financial Market Relations in an Era of Global Finance,” in Gerald 
Curtis, ed., New Perspectives on US-Japan Relations (New York: Japan Center for International Exchange, 
2000). 
22. Steil, Illusions of Liberalization.   12
ample evidence that through 1995, Japanese securities markets had offered only the “illusion of 
liberalization.” In November 1996, then Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto announced his plan 
for “Big Bang” deregulation of financial markets. This plan promised a series of deregulatory 
initiatives through the year 2001. These included allowing price competition on brokerage 
commissions and other financial fees, removal of limits on individuals holding bank accounts 
abroad or trading foreign currencies, removal of restrictions on the trading of derivatives, and 
allowing cross-sectoral competition between banks, securities houses and insurance companies. 
Given the implementation lags for any deregulation initiative, it is difficult to say as yet what the 
ultimate state of the Japanese financial system will be once the banking crisis is resolved. 
Japanese savers have suffered some hard lessons in recent years, and perhaps as a result 
their savings behavior has if anything grown more conservative (see figure 2). Demand deposits 
at banks and in Postal Savings have continued to account for around 55 percent of Japanese 
household savings throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Holdings of equities and bonds, which did 
rise in the 1980s with the asset price boom, have been halved since then. In fact, security and 
investment trusts have not been growing, despite some deregulation measures meant to encourage 
their growth. As will be discussed in the next section, it is the Japanese savers’ unwillingness to 
move their money to seek out higher returns, which allows Japan to withstand its financial 
problems, which explains the lack of political demand for resolution, and which is the major drag 
on the forces for convergence.  
 
1C. Financial Flows between the United States and Japan  
It is often observed that capital flows between nations, and the desire to control or maximize 
inflows, is a major concern of economic policy today. The United States-Japan relationship 
putatively is affected by the huge flows between the two countries. Yet, transpacific financial 
flows have developed fitfully against this backdrop of slow deregulation and temporary crisis in 
the US financial system, and slower deregulation and ongoing fragility in the Japanese financial 
system. Tokyo is one of the world’s major financial centers, and financial firms there allocate 
vast quantities of savings, but it remains relatively underdeveloped versus London and New 
York. In both the United States and Japan, the banks and firms who hold savers’ money are 
actually engaged in vast international transactions–securitized mortgages in the US, for example, 
are re-sold worldwide; CP and interbank markets run 24 hours globally to maintain liquidity for 
the largest corporate players–but domestic savers still invest domestically. 
So the capital flows between the world’s first and second largest economies, between the 
world’s biggest net debtor and biggest net creditor have not shown the same growth as global   13
finance overall. One would expect direct banking flows to decline in relative importance as better 
corporate borrowers seek out disintermediated finance via securities.
23 And, it is clear that US 
bank claims on (loans to) Japan have been steadily declining since the height of the bubble, from 
$1.7 trillion outstanding to $220 billion, one-eighth of where it started; as a percent of total US 
banks’ claims on foreigners, the decline over the period is from 24 percent to 3.5 percent, one-
seventh. This lack of direct exposure may explain the relative lack of concern in some American 
quarters about Japanese financial problems. US banks’ liabilities to Japan, shows a more mixed 
picture since 1988–the amount outstanding has fluctuated between $1.05 trillion and $1.9 trillion, 
first declining from 1988 to 1991, then rising again from 1994 to 1998. This would seem to 
reflect changing borrowing costs, where the “carry trade” of borrowing from Japanese banks 
charging near zero nominal interest rates and reinvesting elsewhere is profitable. Even as the 
level of borrowing rose up to surpass old highs, however, the share of Japanese lending in US 
bank liabilities abroad remained largely steady in the 11-13 percent range. 
Moving to the holdings of equities, a different pattern emerges. The total sales and total 
purchases of US corporate stocks by Japanese investors have both been growing strongly since 
mid-1995. Both spent the 1990-1995 period fluctuating between $10-25 billion per month.
24 
Since then, equity flows have grown steadily to a little more than $100 billion per month in 
purchases by Japanese, a little less than $100 billion in sales. The net purchases (or sales) have 
been largely undisturbed by this five or six-fold increase in capital flow, remaining at essentially 
zero, though varying month-to-month from positive to negative. Even ten years of monthly flows 
in the billions do not add up to large quantities of American equities in Japanese portfolios if the 
net each month is plus-or-minus $5 billion or less.  
Conversely, foreign direct investment (FDI) is a form of capital flow with implications 
beyond those implied by its small volume. It is a flow that tends to be lasting, it often involves 
corporate control and transfers of technology and management techniques, and it has a visible 
political symbolism that many more liquid financial flows lack. Countries often have mixed 
feelings about foreign direct investment. If inflows come, the country can fear being “taken 
over”; if inflows do not come, the country can ask what makes itself unattractive. Similarly, if 
FDI flows out, the country can worry about exporting jobs, but if no FDI goes out, it can worry 
about missing out on opportunities left to others. As discussed below, the Unites States and Japan 
have experienced all of these feelings.  
                                                            
23. Less good corporate borrowers are unlikely to have access to international capital markets, and likely to 
be dependent upon loans from their local bank. 
24. This appears to be a tiny fraction of the outstanding bank liabilities, but the equity number is a monthly 
flow whereas the bank liabilities are an outstanding stock.   14
Figure 3 gives the picture of annual flows of FDI to the United States from Japan, and 
vice versa. FDI from Japan to the United States was very high in the late 1980s, as the yen was 
strong and Japanese assets were very expensive relative to American ones. Despite the apparent 
attractiveness of the US economy in the 1990s to foreign investors, the relative expensiveness of 
American companies and the relative lack of investment funds in Japan due to the recession there 
kept FDI below $2.5 billion a year. Meanwhile, American FDI into Japan remained a trickle 
throughout this period, though 1998 and 2000 were record years for the inflow. To put the 
numbers in perspective, Japanese FDI outflow to the United States in 2000 was five times the US 
FDI inflow to Japan in the record year.
25  If there is an asymmetry in US-Japan financial flows 
that might be exploited or politically sensitive, this would be one, especially since it is so 
persistent. 
Another financial flow that is much remarked upon for its asymmetry is the vast Japanese 
holdings of American treasury bonds. Even as Japanese issuance of government debt grew 
enormously over the 1990s, less than 6 percent of Japanese Government Bonds (JGBs) were held 
outside of Japan.
26 Meanwhile, Japanese holdings of American treasury bills and notes during 
America’s run-up of debt in the late-1980s reached over 40 percent of the total. Several people on 
the US side worried about American “dependence” upon Japanese capital, while some Japanese 
officials and politicians made vague threats at times of dumping T-bills in retaliation for 
American actions.
27 Net monthly sales of US Treasuries by Japanese investors (figure 4) rarely 
exceeded $50 billion, and only once exceeded $100 billion, since January 1988. This is hardly a 
prepossessing number for a national debt numbered in the trillions and, until recently, issuing 
billions of dollars of new treasuries every month. The only large net sales sustained for more than 
a month were in late 1995 and in 1997-98, which again makes sense as times of acute financial 
distress lead investors to meet cash calls by selling their most liquid assets. The economic 
fundamentals rather than any political agenda seem to be the main driver of Japanese net sales of 




                                                            
25. American Chamber of Commerce in Japan, US-Japan Business White Paper 2001 (Tokyo: 2001). 
Among the G-7, the next highest ratio of FDI outflow-to-inflow is 2.8 for Germany, while all the rest are 
below 1.5. 
26. No figures are available on how many of these are held by Americans as opposed to other foreigners. 
27. In a speech on 23 June 1997, at Columbia University then Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto said 
Japan had been “tempted to sell US Treasuries and buy gold” on a number of occasions, mostly arising   15
2.  THE EFFECT OF FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENTS ON US-JAPAN RELATIONS TO 
DATE 
 
The American and Japanese financial systems have been going through much the same process of 
liberalization, but with the United States starting earlier and moving faster.
28 As outlined in the 
previous section, this process has included for both economies a banking crisis, and an abrupt rise 
in inwards FDI from the other country, again with the US experiencing them first, and Japan still 
in the throes of both transitions as of summer 2001. The Japanese Big Bang financial deregulation 
initiatives, if carried through, would tear down the walls separating investment from commercial 
banking, and smaller investors from the markets, much as the long-succession of legislation 
coming through the US Congress in the 1980s and 1990s eventually repealed Glass-Steagall. 
Cross-border equity flows, FDI, and sales of US Treasuries all grew over the 1990s, without clear 
secular trends, consistent with integrating financial markets. 
Despite this tendency toward convergence, or at least staggered movements down the 
same path, there were two important divergences. First, Japanese savers’ behavior changed less in 
line with financial deregulation than American savers’ behavior, and if anything became more 
risk-averse over the 1990s. Second, and perhaps not unrelated, the American process of 
liberalization was accompanied by increasing confidence in the US financial “model” and its 
benefits as the process went on, while in Japan the opposite reaction was felt. Undoubtedly, these 
contrasting confidence effects were largely the result of the diverging growth and unemployment 
performance of the two economies over the period.
29 Nevertheless, the divergence in confidence 
also reflected the different starting points of the two financial systems, with the American 
adjustment to liberalization being more one of degree, while the Japanese adjustment definitely 
being one of kind. 
These similarities and differences made themselves felt in US-Japan economic relations 
over the last twenty years, but primarily within their own realm. That is, there were examples of 
conflict and cooperation over the pace of deregulation in Japan in relation to US exports and 
direct investment, over the response to overt Japanese financial fragility in 1997-1998, and over 
                                                                                                                                                                             
when the United States failed to stabilize exchange rates. In an editorial in The Financial Times the next 
day, this remark was characterized as a “veiled threat.” 
28. Vogel, Freer Markets, More Rules, and Steil, Illusions of Liberalization, argue that through the mid-
1990s the power and preferences of Japanese (mostly MOF) bureaucrats determined a uniquely Japanese 
form of financial liberalization which included persistent or re-regulation. For purposes of this paper, 
however, the broad similarities of pressures on both the Japanese and American banking systems, the 
similar rise of securitized corporate finance, the common experience of financial crisis and regulatory 
forbearance in response, and the enhancements in information and access available to investors constitute 
essentially the same process of liberalization. 
29. Grimes’ chapter in this volume describes this reversal on macroeconomic performance.   16
how changes in the market influenced the financial regulations and model that the two countries 
could advocate in Asian emerging markets. There was, however, little evidence of either financial 
flows (from Japan to the United States, in the form of Treasuries purchases) or financial 
confidence (waxing in the United States, waning in Japan) granting leverage by one country over 
the other in broader economic discussions, let alone in matters of national security. In general, 
even in the decade since the end of the Cold War, security aspects of US-Japan relations have run 
on a separate track.
30 The declining importance of G-7 summits and of macroeconomic policy 
coordination is evident over the 1980s and 1990s as well, but appears to be driven by the rise of 
markets and the decline of interventionist ideology across all the industrialized economies.
31  
 
2A. Relations over Financial Regulations and Financial Services Trade 
In theory, banking regulators should form a relatively close fraternity, if not an “epistemic 
community,” across national borders. They share a similarity of goals and pressures, a common 
sensibility, and often direct experience working together through numerous international fora, 
postings in each others’ countries, and training efforts through the Bank for International 
Settlements and the International Monetary Fund.
32 In today’s integrated financial markets, they 
have little choice but to exchange information – not only are subsidiaries of Japanese financial 
firms active in US markets (and to a lesser degree, vice versa), but loans between Japanese and 
American banks, and movements in asset prices in each country, tie financial stability within one 
country to the other. This is a classic example of interdependence, where openness and 
integration increases both capabilities and vulnerabilities. Since the creation of the Basle Capital 
Adequacy Standard for Banks in 1996, commercial banks active in international markets have 
been subjected to a clear common standard of evaluation for the asset side of their portfolios. This 
standard was created with the participation and assent of both American and (grudgingly) 
Japanese regulators. 
When push came to shove in US and Japanese financial markets in the 1980s and 1990s, 
however, relations between regulators were not entirely smooth. As described in Steil,
33 Japanese 
financial regulators made entry for American financial firms extremely difficult, through use of 
discretionary power and their relationships with domestic incumbents. During the late 1980s, the 
                                                            
30. See Green and other chapters in this volume. 
31. C. Randall Henning, “US-Japan Macroeconomic Relations in the Last Three Decades of the Twentieth 
Century,” Mimeograph (Institute for International Economics, 2000). 
32. Dwyer, “US-Japan Financial Market Relations in an Era of Global Finance,” notes that Japanese 
financial regulators in New York have offices across the street from the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York, implying that there is an easy neighborliness between the two. 
33. Steil, Illusions of Liberalization.   17
major Japanese banks became the world’s largest, due to their enormous deposit bases, but they 
also had some of the lowest returns on assets.
34 Japanese regulators would hear no warnings that 
consolidation was coming, however, being able to point to the simultaneous American difficulties 
during the S&L crisis. In a particularly notable example of lack of coordination in even day-to-
day supervision, the MOF learned in August 1995 that one employee had caused and hidden huge 
losses in the New York operations of Daiwa Bank. Neither Daiwa’s US operating officers nor the 
MOF regulators informed the Federal Reserve until six more weeks had passed, during which 
time Daiwa’s counterpart banks were at risk. In the first half of 1998, when fragility in the 
Japanese banking system peaked, American regulators “ring-fenced” most Japanese banks in the 
New York markets, excluded them from the Fed’s discount window, and asked them to have on-
hand cash sufficient to cover their overnight balances.
35 While this was in no sense intended as a 
political or threatening act, it clearly conveyed the message that American bank regulators had a 
far different and more pessimistic view of Japan’s banks than their own regulators. 
The evident lack of learning by Japanese regulators from the policy mistakes of the 
American S&L crisis is particularly striking. Posen characterizes both the Japanese and American 
financial crises as following a similar dynamic, right down to the regulators’ slow response: 
 
[T]he grounds for crisis are laid with protection of the banking system from competition (e.g., 
Japan’s convoy regulations), followed by partial gradual deregulation. Turning to policy 
response, banking supervisors allow a credit boom for lower-quality borrowers to occur in 
hopes of restoring bank profitability when the large, good borrowers go directly to capital 
markets. Of course, this just adds to the potential trouble on bank balance sheets when things 
go south. Regulators observe the bad loans, but keep quiet due to the banks’ implicit or 
explicit offers of direct benefits and future employment, as well as bureaucratic disincentives 
to delivering bad news, and simple lack of experience with accurately evaluating risky loan 
portfolios. When the bust comes, supervisors engage in forbearance, meaning that they allow 
banks time to carry non-performing loans rather than demanding write-downs...The 
interaction of moral hazard on the part of the banks and regulatory forbearance on the part of 
supervisors is what causes the spiraling accumulation of bad loans. This was the story in the 
United States in the 1980s...And despite this cautionary example, this was also the story in 
Japan in the 1990s...
 36 
                                                            
34. Anil Kashyap, “Discussions of the Financial Crisis,” in Ryoichi Mikitani and Adam S. Posen, eds., 
Japan’s Financial Crisis and Its Parallels to US Experience (Institute for International Economics, 2000). 
35. Ring-fencing means increasing supervisory scrutiny and discouraging other banks from having 
unreserved exposure to the banks under monitoring. Exclusion from the discount window forces the Bank 
of Japan (in this case) to provide upfront the extra liquidity for the US operations of these banks. Both of 
these measures significantly constrain the ability of banks to conduct business. 
36. Posen, Adam S., “Introduction: Financial Similarities and Monetary Differences,” in Ryoichi Mikitani 
and Adam S. Posen, eds., Japan’s Financial Crisis and Its Parallels to US Experience (Insititute for 
International Economics, 2000), pp. 7-8. This is a mainstream view in economics. Cargill, Hutchison, and 
Ito, Financial Policy and Central Banking in Japan; Friedman, “Japan Now and the United States Then;” 
Glauber and Kashyap, “Discussions of the Financial Crisis;” Hoshi and Kashyap, Corporate Financing and   18
 
Given that US regulators already had been taken to task for the S&L crisis in a litany of 
congressional hearings, central bank sponsored conferences, and published policy analyses by 
1992, it is impossible to claim that Japanese regulators and politicians were not warned against 
repeating American mistakes.
37 The warnings became only more public and specific as the 1990s 
progressed, and the size of the Japanese bad loan problem swelled.
38 Cynical observers will not 
be surprised, because there is no room in this standard financial crisis story for learning; rather 
the incentives to inaction are universal given the situation. Yet the inability of this knowledge to 
transfer successfully between regulatory peers is an important cautionary note about the limits of 
coordination and expertise as influences on policy. 
The great size of the Japanese banking problem, taken against the background of Japan’s 
economic stagnation in the 1990s and the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, made it an issue of 
enormous salience in US-Japan macroeconomic policy discussions. In fact, there was little 
dispute on either side of the Pacific that both Japan’s stagnation and Asia’s crisis were in some 
part caused by the banking problem. Sakakibara
39 recalls that in the summer of 1998 
“Washington demanded clear plans to dispose of banks’ bad loans and additional stimulus 
measures. However, Tokyo could not immediately present practical measures in line with the 
request.” The Diet session had closed, and an upper house election was due in July. The yen was 
in sharp decline against the dollar in this atmosphere, and on June 17, the US and Japan 
intervened jointly to support the yen at 137.60 per dollar. “As suspected by Rubin and others, the 
effects of joint [exchange rate] intervention did not last long. In August, the yen started to weaken 
again toward the high [dollar value] of ¥140 per dollar.”
40 As noted in the previous section, 
partial bank reform and recapitalization had to wait until October 1998 to be passed by the new 
Japanese Diet.
41 The financial fragility in Japan had drawn in the US Treasury, normally removed 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Governance in Japan; and Shimizu, “Convoy Regulation, Bank Management, and the Financial Crisis in 
Japan,” all make similar assessments. 
37. See the references in Friedman, “Japan Now and the United States Then,” and Glauber and Kashyap, 
“Discussions of the Financial Crisis,” for some of the criticism of US mistakes. 
38. The various annual publications of the American dominated IMF and the OECD were quite explicit on 
these points, including references to past US errors. 
39. Sakakibara, “US-Japanese Economic Policy Conflicts and Coordination,” p. 181. 
40. Eisuke Sakakibara, “US-Japanese Economic Policy Conflicts and Coordination during the 1990s,” in 
Ryoichi Mikitani and Adam S. Posen, eds., Japan’s Financial Crisis and Its Parallels to US Experience 
(Institute for International Economics, 2000), p. 182. Interestingly, though Sakakibara is on record in 
numerous places as an advocate of exchange rate intervention as a policy tool, he admits that most of the 
interventions of the 1990s failed to have the desired or any lasting effect.  
41. Sakakibara, “US-Japanese Economic Policy Conflicts and Coordination,” claims that this reform was 
only possible because the US government became more “pragmatic” following the Russian bond default 
and LTCM collapse bringing the crisis home. He blames the US puritanism on bank reform for the   19
from banking issues, and the MOF’s International Finance Division, also normally separated from 
such concerns; the situation had also provoked the one major concerted foreign exchange 
intervention of Robert Rubin’s tenure as Treasury Secretary contrary to his declared skepticism 
for such measures and his “strong dollar” policy. This added to the sense that US foreign 
exchange intervention was a favor to elicit the October 1998 legislation. 
The escalation of Japan’s domestic financial problem into a matter for the highest levels 
of economic diplomacy was preceded and accompanied by a sharp decline in the civility, public 
and private, of US-Japan economic relations between 1996 and 1999. Japanese officials publicly 
complained of being lectured to by domineering and insensitive United States officials; American 
officials felt frustrated by Japanese government intransigence against using what appeared to be 
obvious remedies to a situation of even more obvious crisis.
42 Vice Minister of Finance Eisuke 
Sakakibara and Deputy Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers became poster children in their 
opposite countries for the degree of tension. Notably, all of this escalating conflict occurred 
despite the relative lack of trade disputes at the time even with a widening bilateral US trade 
deficit, and therefore the absence from the discussion of the normally more conflictual US Trade 
Representative, Department of Commerce, and Congress.  
Even more importantly, neither the public conflict nor the concerted intervention nor the 
common knowledge and transnational forums available to economic policymakers produced 
much in the way of policy change in Japan. While the American demands or suggestions did give 
the Obuchi government some of its agenda for fall 1998,
43 as well as add to its sense of urgency, 
what is striking is how partial and slow the response still was to the international attention paid to 
a domestic Japanese economic problem. This slowness persists despite the combination of  
resolution being in Japan’s overall economic self-interest, having significant international  
spillovers on the United States and Japan’s Asian neighbors, and (along with economic stimulus 
in Japan) being one of the foremost goals of overall US international economic policy.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Japanese public’s reluctance to inject public capital into the banks. Jeffrey Shafer, “The International 
Aspects of Japanese Monetary Policy,” in Ryoichi Mikitani and Adam S. Posen, eds., Japan’s Financial 
Crisis and Its Parallels to US Experience (Institute for International Economics, 2000), strenuously 
contradicts this view of US government intentions. 
42. Shafer, “International Aspects of Japanese Monetary Policy,” among others, recalls the disappointment 
that American officials felt in 1996-97 having their private advice to the MOF not to raise the consumption 
tax ignored. This experience may have contributed to some of the public tack and tone emerging from the 
US Treasury for changes in Japanese policy in the late 1990s, though the pressures from the Asian crisis 
were obviously the main factor.   20
Trade in financial services has also in recent years emerged as an area of growing, though 
still limited, importance in bilateral US-Japan and multilateral trade negotiations. This is in part 
because the United States recognizes this as a sector where it has a clear competitive advantage.
44 
There are also public policy motivations stemming from the belief that Japan’s economic 
problems and its structural differences with the United States stem in large part from the low 
returns to capital and the low rank of shareholders in the Japanese economy.
45 At present, these 
discussions have not really differed much from other trade negotiations, and in fact the deals in 
this sector have attracted less attention than such matters as steel, auto parts, and plate glass did in 
the United States. 
The most significant negotiation to date was over access of American insurers to the 
Japanese market. Japanese insurance had long been cartelized, with three sectors, traditional life, 
traditional non-life, and a third sector for smaller or more innovative products.
46 In July 1993, 
insurance was named as a priority sector under the US-Japan Framework Talks, and, in October 
1994, a “Framework Agreement on Insurance Sector Measures” was agreed. There were clear 
differences between the MOF’s implementation of the agreement and what American negotiators 
believed they had signed, so negotiations resumed in 1995. In April 1996, a new Insurance 
Business law was passed in Japan, along with a number of supplementary measures, and then 
additional deregulation and access was granted as part of the WTO Financial Services Agreement 
of December 1997. The main result has been to get American firms access to the Japanese auto 
insurance market, along with the right to differentiate policy rates on the basis of age, and to have 
the policies sold independently rated for soundness. American firms also gained control of most 
of the third sector where new products are offered. Still, as of FY1998, foreign insurers held only 
4.6 percent of the total market versus a usual foreign firm market share of 10-33 percent in the 
rest of the G-7.
47  
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
43. Council on Foreign Relations, 2000, Task Force Report: Future Direction for US Economic Policy 
Toward Japan (www.cfr.org/p/pubs/Japan_TaskForce.html [date of access]), Appendix. 
44. Catherine Mann, Is the US Trade Deficit Sustainable? (Institute for International Economics, 1999), 
goes so far as to suggest that liberalization of financial and other business services, allowing for more 
exports from the United States, would significantly reduce the overall US trade deficit. 
45. This was clearly recognized as a possibility as early as the 1983 yen-dollar talks. See Henning, “US-
Japan Macroeconomic Relations in the Last Three Decades of the Twentieth Century,” among others, for 
more recent discussions emphasizing the low returns to capital.  
46. A concentration ratio of market share among the top 5 companies would be 60 percent in both life and 
non-life. 
47. This summary draws on the “Insurance” entry in ACCJ (2001). Steven Vogel notes that once US firms 
did dominate the third insurance sector, the US government argued that Japan should not liberalize that 
sector before liberalizing the rest of the insurance market. This had some economic logic, but politically 
was viewed in Japan as an instance of hypocrisy by the United States (with some justification).   21
 
 
2B. Relations over Capital Flows 
The largest swing in capital flowing between the United States and Japan in the last twenty years 
has involved US Treasuries and Japanese government bonds. During the 1980s, the United States 
government accumulated an unprecedented amount of public debt in peacetime as a result of the 
Reagan fiscal policies, while the Japanese government slowly but steadily paid off the expanded 
public debt it issued in 1975 after the first oil shock. The picture reversed completely in the 
1990s, with the US federal government steadily reducing its deficits and then its stock of 
outstanding debt through annual surpluses. The Japanese government ran up an even larger debt-
to-GDP ratio over the course of the 1990s, though more through tax revenue shortfalls than 
through intentional deficit spending to counter the recession. These vast movements in the stocks 
of government debt available to the market, however, conceal a major asymmetry in the flow of 
capital between the two countries. 
Put simply, Japanese and other foreign investors purchase a great deal of US Treasury 
bills and notes, while US and other foreign investors purchase only a small fraction (currently, 
about 5 percent) of JGBs issued. Figure 5 displays the Japanese share of total foreign purchases 
and sales of US Treasury bonds and notes since 1988. Interestingly, Japanese shares and 
purchases seem to move in tandem, which is consistent with the view in figure 4 of small net 
sales of Treasuries by Japanese investors without multi-month trends. Nevertheless, when the US 
public debt was at its height in 1988-1990, Japanese purchasers made up 50 percent of total 
foreign buyers, and they already held upwards of 40 percent of the outstanding debt. In 1990-92, 
Japanese investors hit hard by the bubble’s burst no longer had spare cash to put into Treasuries, 
and dropped out of the market. Since 1992, as cash continued to be tight, strong availability has 
led to JGBs replacing Treasuries as the main inflow into Japanese investors’ portfolios.  
As previously noted, the perception that Japanese holdings of US public debt gave 
Japanese officials a means of threatening US policymakers – that Japan could “dump” Treasuries, 
and thereby roil US markets and drive up US interest rates – was widely held in both Japan and 
the United States, though more so in the former. The facts that the US economy was importing a 
great deal of capital annually, that this capital inflow allowed US investment and consumption to 
exceed domestic production and savings, and that Japanese savers hold a lot of the assets that 
were sold to gain the capital are undeniable. The interpretation that links these as something 
controllable by conscious policy, however, is flawed analytically and unsupported by the 
historical record. The basic problem is that capital flows are the result of thousands of   22
decentralized individual decisions to buy and sell, and those decisions are largely driven by 
economic fundamentals. At the margin that moves markets, and beyond, they are not up to the 
discretion of policymakers on either side of the Pacific. 
Japanese savers hold their assets overwhelmingly in low-risk, low-return demand 
deposits and life insurance, with a large portion of those assets automatically invested in JGBs. 
Japanese banks and other financial firms on their own accounts are the major owners of US 
Treasuries in Japan. In their portfolios, these highly liquid bonds play a key role in the settlement 
of payments, as well as being a store of value. While it is true that a depreciation of the dollar 
would lead to capital losses on Treasuries holdings in yen terms, a rise in interest rates on JGBs 
would have similar effects, so there is no truly “risk-free” asset available to these firms, and it 
therefore pays to diversify. To claim that these investment decisions would be subject to 
government direction is mistaken, even in Japan. Were the Treasuries to be somehow dumped in 
large measure at once by Japanese banks, they would have to replace the safe assets in their 
capital with something of equivalent security. Japanese regulators would also have to somehow 
come up with a justification for telling financial firms to shed the world’s most liquid security, 
one without credit risk.  
Of course, the United States government could do something to cause rational individual 
investors to sell off Treasuries. It is perfectly sensible that the policies of a debt-issuing 
government could have a direct effect on the perceptions of investors, and that the perceptual shift 
would be widely shared. It is this threat of losing the faith of international capital markets that 
disciplines the monetary and fiscal policies of many emerging markets.  
Yet, there are two related reasons why this theoretical possibility is unlikely to be a factor 
in US-Japan relations today and in the future. First, there is nothing distinctive about the 
Treasuries owned by Japanese as opposed other foreign, or for that matter American, investors. A 
policy which is likely to bring about sales of US debt is going to a first approximation to be 
perceived similarly by all holders of that debt. European or even American capital can leave the 
United States just as easily as Japanese capital can, so the issue becomes one of the general 
economic effects of a policy shift, not one of bilateral foreign relations. Second, the fact that a 
large amount of Japanese savings are invested in US Treasuries does not mean that the United 
States is in any sense dependent upon Japan to fund its debt. Just as the sustainability of the US 
current account deficit depends upon its overall level and not any particular bilateral trade 
balance, the inflation and currency risks of Treasuries determine their demand and the particular 
composition of who holds them is largely irrelevant. Were Japanese savings for foreign policy 
reasons to go en masse into another safe asset to substitute for US Treasuries, such as JGBs or   23
German Bunds, this would drive down the returns on that substitute asset for those already 
holding it, and would induce those people to increase their holdings of US Treasuries.  
This lack of leverage from capital flows in and out of the US Treasuries market can be 
seen in the historical record. The Japanese share of Treasuries purchases has been steadily 
declining, with a sharp fall in 1990-92, and large net sales in 1996-1998 (as can be seen in 
Figures 4-5), and there is no evidence of the United States being more accommodative of 
Japanese demands on policy as a result during those periods. There is also no sign of any 
particular Japanese policy decisions being the source of the sales, while the economic events in 
Japan raising investors’ need for cash explains these movements easily. Meanwhile, total 
American public debt has been declining markedly over the second half of the 1990s, and there is 
no evidence of a secular decline in Japanese influence over US economic policy. The same logic 
held in the opposite direction when the US public debt rose over the 1980s; the Plaza Accord of 
1985 and the Louvre Accord of 1987, and the macroeconomic coordination associated with them, 
would seem to indicate that mounting US debt did not bolster Japanese resistance to American 
economic demands, let alone increase the ability to force changes in US policy.
48 
The other main type of capital flow to merit discussion as a potential influence on US-
Japan relations is that of foreign direct investment. As discussed in the previous section, cross-
border portfolio equity flows remain small between the United States and Japan, and movements 
in transpacific bank loans seem to be driven by medium-term economic factors. In 1986-91, the 
declining dollar and the rise in Japanese asset values led to the first large inflow of Japanese 
investment into the United States.
49 Coming at a time of unemployment, historically large trade 
deficits, and perceived lack of competitiveness, there were numerous episodes of popular 
backlash against “foreign takeovers.” Despite various debates in the US Congress, however, no 
legislation was passed to counter the inward investment, and no efforts were exerted in bilateral 
US-Japan talks to curtail the flow.  
                                                            
48. In fact, it is another widely held myth that the American call for Japanese macroeconomic expansion at 
the time of the Louvre Accord led to the Japanese asset price bubble. Leaving aside the contradiction 
between these two myths about which nation had influence as US public debt rose, this blaming of the 
bubble on US pressure is unjustified. Suffice it to say that it is far from obvious that US pressure produced 
the specific BOJ monetary policies held responsible for the bubble (given the timing), that those 
scapegoated monetary policies actually caused the bubble (given the fundamentals), and that the bubble had 
to have the impact it did on the Japanese economy (given transmission mechanisms). See Henning, “US-
Japan Macroeconomic Relations”; Toshiki Jinushi, Yoshihiro Kuroki, and Ryuzo Miyao, “Monetary Policy 
in Japan Since the Late 1980s: Delayed Policy Actions and Some Explanations,” in Ryoichi Mikitani and 
Adam S. Posen, eds., Japan’s Financial Crisis and Its Parallels to US Experience (Institute for 
International Economics, 2000); and Kashyap, “Discussions of the Financial Crisis.” 
49. Edward Graham and Paul Krugman, Foreign Direct Investment in the Unites States (Third Edition, 
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It is incredible to think of the transformation in attitudes. Ten years later, there is hardly a 
stir when recent FDI flows into the United States have dwarfed the previous record annual 
inflows of 1989-90.
50 When Senator Ernest Hollings tried in summer 2000 to make the takeover 
of Voicestream by Deutsche Telekom a national security issue, he lost a Senate vote 99-1. Honda 
had an advertising campaign in the late 1990s showing a red, white, and blue Civic automobile, 
declaring how much of the car was made in US plants they owned.  
In Japan, significant FDI inflows began only in 1998, and public attention was drawn to 
such notable acquisitions as Renault taking over Nissan, and Ripplewood Holdings purchasing 
the nationalized LTCB (later Shinsei Bank). There was some publicly vocalized discontent, 
especially when both firms quickly and visibly engaged in non-Japanese corporate behaviors: 
laying off workers, and refusing to rollover Sogo department store’s loans, respectively. There 
has also been some greater resistance from parts of the Japanese government than seen in their 
counterparts in the United States,
51 but METI is on record wanting to encourage more inward 
FDI. Whether this resistance to FDI will be transitional on the part of Japanese citizens and 
officials (as it was in the United States), or whether the opening for inwards FDI is a temporary 
one created by the weakness and insecurity of the current Japanese economic situation, remains to 
be seen. As will be argued in the concluding section, that sort of weakness is likely to increase in 
Japan in the near future, particularly in the financial sector, which will probably increase the 
acceptance and inflow of FDI. 
2C. Relations over the Financial Model for Emulation 
US-Japan relations take place at a number of levels, and in economic matters, the ideational issue 
of who has the “better model” has at times played a critical role. There is the matter of relative 
self-confidence in bilateral relations on the part of the policymakers in light of their nation’s 
economic performance, and therefore their support or perceived competence at home.
52 While 
important, this factor alone is too narrow a consideration of the economic model debate’s impact. 
Such assessments encompass a richer range of ideas than just pointing to the most recent national 
growth and trade statistics, and influence a broader range of specific issues besides general 
bargaining confidence or popular tensions. The relative merits of financial systems, with the 
arms-length, market-based, securitized model on the US (or U.K.) side versus relationship-based, 
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Japanese Equities,” Mimeograph (Merrill Lynch: 21 May 2001). 
51. The FSA made sure to sell off the other nationalized major Japanese bank, the former NCB, to a 
domestic purchaser, for example, even though there was a valid foreign bid. 
52. Grimes in this volume ties lagged perceptions of macroeconomic performance to broader US-Japan 
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mixed claims, bank dominant model on the Japanese (or German) side, have been heatedly 
discussed by academics, businesspeople, policymakers, and pundits over the entire period this 
chapter analyzes. As will be described, the running state of this debate has directly influenced 
such aspects of US-Japan relations as the frequency of coordinated exchange rate intervention, 
the composition of capital flows between the US and Japan, and the bilateral economic agenda in 
terms of respective national wish lists.
53 Examination reveals that the underlying economic and 
political factors driving convergence have led to lasting effects of the American dominance in 
these financial ideas in recent years, whereas the earlier ascendance of the Japanese financial 
model in the discussion had negligible long-term impact.
54 
Exchange rate levels and volatility have been a major source of frustration for 
governments since the end of Bretton Woods – rarely is an economy’s exchange rate at the 
desired level, and it never stays put if it gets there. For government officials accustomed to 
allocating credit and controlling domestic interest rates, like those of the Japanese MOF, 
intervention to stabilize exchange rates is consistent with a general distrust of markets and a 
belief that they can be controlled. For government officials who have experience with the 
financial markets and are more accustomed to rules-based rather than results-oriented government 
action, like those of the US Treasury, intervention to stabilize exchange rates is deemed likely to 
be ineffectual or counter-productive.
55 Ideology appears to matter more than trade exposure in 
determining this outlook, as the United States some time ago became a more open (as measured 
by [imports+exports]/GDP) economy than Japan, and some US export industries have to compete 
as much or more on price than some high-value-added Japanese manufactures. 
The liberalization of international financial markets, starting with the lifting of capital 
controls in the United States in 1980 and running through deregulation of individuals’ foreign 
exchange holdings in Japan in 1998, has prompted an explosion in the volume of daily foreign 
exchange transactions. The objective question of whether, under what conditions, sterilized 
foreign exchange rate intervention will be effective, given the size of the market, is still under 
                                                            
53. The economic recommendations proffered to emerging markets by the IMF and the World Bank, and 
the course of Asian monetary cooperation, are also affected by the relative perceived benefits of the 
American and Japanese financial systems. Searight in this volume addresses these two points from an 
international institutions perspective, emphasizing the institutions’ independent role in forming these 
outcomes.  
54. This is quite clearly the opposite outcome of the debate over the means of industrial production, where 
the Japanese model has largely remained triumphant, even as Japanese growth has receded. 
55. Though even some American officials will be sympathetic to the view that exchange rate levels and 
volatility can (damagingly) diverge from values justified by “fundamentals,” they are less likely to believe 
anything can be done about it. See Clarida (1999) and C. Randall Henning, Currencies and Politics in the 
United States, Germany, and Japan (Institute for International Economics, 1994).   26
debate, though most contemporary macroeconomists are skeptical.
56 For the US-Japan 
relationship, however, the emerging American view that intervention is unlikely to produce 
desirable results has clearly not only limited the frequency of concerted intervention in the 1990s, 
it has eroded some support for exchange rate targeting in Japan.  
Sakakibara
57 describes wistfully how a series of concerted and then unilateral exchange 
rate interventions to weaken the yen against the dollar in 1995 and 1996 failed to have noticeable 
effects, and how the US Treasury was reluctant to intervene even once to slow the yen’s fall in 
June 1998. Keidanren, the Japanese association of large businesses, has dedicated a diminishing 
amount of space and effort to the exchange rate issue in recent statements about desired policy. 
This decreasing emphasis occurred even against a backdrop of the Japanese and American 
governments (but not the BOJ) seeming to agree that a weaker yen would be desirable, if linked 
to bank reforms. On April 5 2001, Haruhiko Kuroda, Japan’s Vice Minister of International 
Finance, wrote an op-ed in The Asian Wall Street Journal tying the yen’s decline that month to 
fundamentals, and indicating that intervention would not be forthcoming. Though political 
pressures from Asian neighbors opposed to yen weakness made him back off that position the 
next day, it was a leading indicator that the incoming Koizumi government would not be making 
currency moves a major part of its economic agenda. 
Beliefs about financial systems also influenced the form of capital flows between the two 
countries over the last two decades, but asymmetrically. The core issue was over corporate 
governance. Japan’s “main bank system” was one of mixed claims by stakeholders over corporate 
enterprises – lenders sat on corporate boards, held stock in the firm, intermediated relationships 
with other companies, and stepped in to change strategy or management during times of corporate 
distress.
58  In contrast, US corporate governance by outsiders had many divisions between 
investors and management, an absence of cross-shareholdings, an emphasis on shareholder rights 
and dividends to the exclusion of other stakeholders, and a combination of bankruptcy and hostile 
takeovers to deal with corporate distress. Amidst concerns for American competitiveness, the 
well- known business strategist Michael Porter, writing in the Harvard Business Review in 1992, 
was one of many to decry the “short-termism” of American management due to the emphasis on  
 
                                                            
56. Taylor (2000) is a recent, econometrically, sophisticated argument that sterilized intervention does 
work for the most part. Kathryn Dominguez and Jeffrey Frankel, Does Foreign Exchange Intervention 
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financial markets and share prices in decision-making. As late as 1995, Fukao could write: 
As Japanese manufacturers began to show their strength in international markets, 
potential problems in the governance of US corporations were brought to light [e.g., 
executive compensation, lack of monitoring]...In addition, the short time-horizons of US 
managers, the possible deleterious effects of mergers and acquisitions on the long-term 
viability of US companies, and the massive layoffs of white-collar workers in the 
recession of 1991-92 all draw public attention to problems in US corporate governance.
59 
One practical upshot of this state of the debate in the late 1980s and early 1990s was a generally 
held belief that there was little point in US foreign direct investment into Japan as there was 
almost no possibility of American firms or partial owners successfully integrating into the web of 
relationships that made the Japanese economy go.  
In hindsight, it appears obvious that the disadvantages of American short-termism were at 
a minimum exaggerated, as were the advantages of Japanese relationship financing. W. Carl 
Kester was ahead of the curve among academic contributors to the debate (albeit unintentionally 
now sounding ironic), writing in 1996 that “over-investment in declining core industries, excess 
manpower, excess product differentiation, and speculative uses of excess cash, among other 
problems, appear to be at least as problematic in Japan as in the United States.”
60 Today in 2001, 
after more than a decade of Japanese bad loans, low returns on capital, and collapsing asset 
values, this is a commonplace view.
61 Yet, this view should not be dismissed as merely a matter 
of bandwagoning on good American economic performance relative to Japan.  
The assessment of the relative advantages of various financial systems was always 
ultimately an empirical question, and one regarding specific predictions about the behavior of 
banks, securities, and nonfinancial firms–not just aggregate economic performance. The weight 
of analysis in recent years has been to argue that the Japanese financial system never quite 
performed the way it was supposed to do in theory, while American finance did function pretty 
much as expected once deregulation began.
62 The exodus of Japan’s best businesses from bank 
                                                            
59. Mitsuhiro Fukao, Financial Integration, Corporate Governance, and the Performance of Multinational 
Companies (Brookings Institution, 1995), p. 3. 
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Suzanne Berger and Ronald Dore, eds., National Diversity and Global Capitalism (Cornell University 
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new opportunities from declining industries, for example, would be more efficient under American-style 
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61. Among many others, see McKinsey (2000), Richard Katz, Japan: The System that Soured (New York: 
ME Sharpe, 1998), and Asher and Dugger (2000). 
62. Again, Hoshi and Kashyap, Corporate Financing and Governance in Japan, collects much of the 
research to date. Recently, some authors have begun to speak of Japan’s economic success in the entire 
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relationships to direct financing on capital markets, and the sudden entry of questionable Japanese 
SME’s into ample access to loans, described in the last section, should not have taken place if the 
Japanese financial system did offer in practice the benefits it was supposed to in theory. 
The comparison with what occurred in the “economic models” debate on the side of 
manufacturing, as opposed to financial systems, is enlightening. At the time that US 
businesspeople and policymakers were suffering from concerns about “international 
competitiveness” in the second half of the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s, American 
management practices, particularly in manufacturing, came at least as much under scrutiny as 
financial practices.
63 Such ideas from Japan and continental Europe as just-in-time inventory, 
quality circles, and team and lean production techniques, were widely adopted in American 
companies; both Japanese home country plants and factories under Japanese ownership or 
management in the United States were visited and studied in detail as models. Unlike with 
regards to the widespread calls for change in American financial practices, which were largely 
ignored in terms of policy or business decisions, at least as difficult and costly changes were 
made to implement these “high-performance work organizations.” Also unlike on the financial 
side, these changes in American manufacturing and work organization have persisted and spread 
in the last decade, even as overall US economic performance began to exceed that of Japan.
64 It 
would be too much of a Whig interpretation of history to suggest that the more economically 
sensible idea always eventually wins out in the market of decision making. Nevertheless, this 
comparative spread of the Japanese manufacturing model and the American financial model, 
affected but not determined by relative macroeconomic performance in the two countries, does 
give credence to the presumption that learning does take place among both business practitioners 
and economic researchers. 
The real-world upshot for US-Japan relations of this intellectual victory by the end of the 
1990s for arms-length, market-based finance has been profound, and is still gaining momentum. 
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One aspect has been the growth in recent years of FDI into Japan, even as the overall world 
market has been betting on American domestic production and investing accordingly. This has 
been matched by policies proposed by METI, and calls from domestic interest groups in Japan, to 
make further changes in corporate governance to encourage and accommodate inwards 
investment, including mergers and acquisitions. In the early 1990s, Japanese multinationals set up 
foreign subsidiaries to deal with matching US accounting rules and insider trading constraints, 
until Japanese regulations on consolidated accounting caught up with US practice in 1998. Cross-
shareholdings have begun to be unwound, following a METI-sponsored law in 1999 to make it 
easier for both banks and non-banks to sell-off reciprocal equity without running into prohibitive 
capital gains. And American investors have come to believe that they can in some instances 
discern the value and connections of Japanese businesses and acquire effective control, and 
venture funds in Japan have grown as a result.
65 
This increased flow in FDI and convergence in approaches to corporate governance has 
had two related effects. First, it has created new domestic private-sector lobbies in each country, 
as well as splits within the Japanese and US governments, that can form trans-national alliances 
for particular policies. “So on the Japanese side, the leadership of Sony Corporation has publicly 
pushed for the addition of outside directors to Japanese corporate boards and the pursuit of 
shareholder value, and Keidanren has called repeatedly for changes in the 100-year-old 
commercial code to allow share repurchases by companies, both of which would also increase the 
friendliness of Japanese financial markets to American M&A activity. These efforts have been 
backed by METI, while the MOF has been silent or opposed. On the American side, there has 
begun to be a meaningful version of the “China lobby” on Japanese trade issues, i.e., American 
firms with enough investment over the wall in Japan to have an interest in directly opposing 
protectionist tendencies in Congress or the US administration. For example, American insurance 
companies have taken a significant share of the Japanese auto insurance market, and American 
auto firms have extensive stakes in Japanese producers,
66 and these new interests have changed 
the tone and terms of the current auto parts negotiations. 
The second impact has been on the bilateral trade agenda between the United States and 
Japan, particularly in terms of American agenda setting. With the rising credibility of inwards 
FDI as a factor, the American priorities have shifted since the mid-1990s in terms of types of 
goals, and sectors pursued, to holding negotiations on sectors such as finance and 
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telecommunications that will leverage structural change in Japan. This is to be distinguished from 
sectors for negotiation being chosen because of either their perceived “strategic significance” to 
the American economy
67 or because of their politically charged visibility as constituting a sizable 
share of the bilateral trade imbalance.
68 The ultimate goal of the policy is to increase sustainable 
Japanese growth for the sake of international financial stability and broad foreign policy goals 
from the US-Japan alliance, not to reduce the bilateral trade deficit per se.  
This recent policy shift reflects a fundamental change in ideational and interest group 
factors likely to last, driven by financial factors, and so far seeming to transcend parties.
69 Current 
Bush Administration US Trade Representative Robert Zoellick has pointed to the negotiations 
conducted over NTT access charges by former Clinton Administration Deputy US Trade 
Representative Richard Fisher in late 2000 as an example of what should be done in the future. 
This was clearly an instance where the change bargained for was likely to help Japan grow, help 
Japanese businesses become more competitive, and not going to cause an immediate large-scale 
boost in Japanese imports of American goods. Keidanren and METI both publicly supported 
reductions in access charges as the negotiations went on, despite the Japanese Ministry of Posts 
and Telecommunications’ strong opposition. The Laura Tyson-chaired Council on Foreign 
Relations Task Force on US-Japan Economic Relations, which, though bipartisan, was popularly 
seen as a blueprint for Japan policy should there have been a Gore administration, conveyed 
much the same message: 
 
Two broad areas of reform should be a major focus of economic dialogue between the 
American and Japanese governments during the next several years – reforms that 
improve the [Japanese] climate for direct investment and financial market reforms 
affecting how capital is raised and allocated [by Japanese businesses].
 70 
NDU (2000), known as the “Armitage Report,”
71 also bipartisan but popularly seen as a 
blueprint for Japan policy in the Bush administration, shared the fundamental message that what 
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was good for Japanese economic growth would be in American national interests, without the 
trade balance being a major factor to take into account. Bush administration Treasury Secretary 
Paul O’Neill picked up on the pro-growth rhetoric for Japan in his first months in office, and 
emphasized cross-national outreach to private-sector leaders in Japanese business as another 
source for convergence. Going forward, this finance and FDI driven agenda is one with a more 
clearly “win-win” economic attitude, with much less likelihood for trade tension between the 
United States and Japan, with a much larger role hoped for from non-state actors, and with much 
different priorities for what changes in Japanese economic structure would be considered 
desirable by the United States. 
 
3.  THE COMING TRANSFORMATION OF JAPANESE FINANCE AND ITS IMPACT 
ON US-JAPAN RELATIONS 
 
Looking at the time since financial deregulation began in the United States, the effect of financial 
liberalization and convergence in the United States and Japan on the two countries’ relationship 
has been a mixed bag. In the last twenty years, there has been extensive financial deregulation in 
both countries, enormous growth of international capital markets, and of overall financial flows 
between the United States and Japan, as well as an increase in investors and corporations on both 
sides of the Pacific taking advantage of market liberalization. Yet, there were many areas where 
financial change had little impact. Instances of Japan or the United States exerting direct leverage 
on the basis of financial advantage upon the other on overall economic policy, let alone on 
broader security issues, are unavailable. The much watched sizable Japanese holdings of US 
Treasury bills and notes proved to have little influence on US behavior, or even on US-Japan 
tensions, as they waxed and waned. Considering the more cooperative aspects of the relationship, 
banking and other financial regulators failed to learn from each others’ mistakes, and often failed 
to communicate with each other, despite the existence of an international framework for so doing. 
Exchange rate management became far less frequent and concerted since the late 1980s, even as 
the volatility of the yen-dollar exchange rate increased (though the causality may have run from 
the latter to the former). 
Still, the increasing intellectual consensus that convergence on the US financial system 
does reflect beneficial (if disruptive) economic forces has caused a marked shift in the agenda for 
US-Japan economic relations more narrowly defined. This shift can be dated from when Japan’s 
banking system breakdown became publicly apparent, in the jusen mini-crisis of 1995, through 
the present day. Underlying this intellectual flow has been a significant increase in the 
willingness of both countries’ multinational corporations and banks, as well as of American (if   32
not Japanese) savers, to bear market risks for the sake of large efficiency gains. A key marker of 
this development has been the expansion of American FDI into Japan, particularly in the financial 
sector, after decades of Japan taking in little or no FDI, and the MOF precluding any entry, 
domestic or foreign, into the Japanese financial system. Japan’s inability to resolve its financial 
difficulties–such that they visibly exceeded the cost and duration of the 1980s US S&L collapse, 
and that they were allowed to persist during and impede resolution of the Asian financial crisis–
underscored the partial nature of its financial liberalization and the cost to Japanese national 
interests of leaving matters unfinished.  
This dating of a surge in the importance and acceptance of financial convergence is 
essentially coincident with the emergence of the American “New Economy” of the late 1990s, 
and the paying down of the United States public debt. One could claim that the shift in behavior 
toward inward FDI by Japanese companies, or in agenda from trade opening to growth and 
financial stability among American officials, really is just another reflection of changing relative 
growth perceptions overall. Yet, as discussed in section 2C, the persistence in the United States of 
Japanese models for manufacturing long after the relative decline in Japanese growth, indicates 
that the specific case for financial convergence rather than some general American triumphalism 
is at work here, as does the apparent irrelevance of Japanese Treasuries holdings.  
The intellectual battle is likely to be as settled as such battles ever are over the course of 
the next year or two. As can be seen in figure 6, plotting the Nikkei and Dow Jones stock 
averages, the United States ran up arguably as much of a “bubble” in stock prices in the late 
1990s as Japan did in the late 1980s. It has been a repeated question from Japanese press and 
politicians, what will happen to the US economy when their bubble bursts? We are already seeing 
that a securitized, less-bank-dependent, more liquid and risk-taking financial system does not 
transmit financial shocks with the same persistence to the real economy that a less diversified, 
collateral-based, less liquid system does. Instead of feedback from asset prices on lending and 
credit in a never ending cycle as Japan has experienced, the United States is having rapid sell-offs 
and reallocation of capital.  
The substantive impact on the US-Japan relationship to date of this recent acceleration of 
financial convergence is clear. On the Japanese side, the support for financial convergence grew: 
private-sector lobbying for changes in the laws affecting corporate governance increased; 
receptivity to American FDI expanded; and nongovernmental allies for American advocates of 
financial change gained strength. On the American side, this convergence encouraged a new 
prioritization of economic policies toward Japan: bilateral negotiations for trade and regulatory 
liberalization shifted focus toward areas relevant to Japan’s investment climate from those   33
traditionally seen as more linked to the bilateral trade deficit; the US Treasury displayed an 
increased willingness to put on pressure, and if necessary, accept higher tensions for restoring 
financial stability in Japan, even as trade disputes receded; and American financial firms suddenly 
became an important lobby on US-Japan issues, largely in favor of reducing tensions where 
possible. In general, for both countries, traditional trade disputes receded in importance even as 
the bilateral trade deficit expanded, and on the financial side efforts moved toward setting rules of 
the game for domestic actors rather than negotiating numerical outcomes.
72 
Is this change likely to persist, or will some form of political backlash turn it around 
despite the intellectual momentum behind the trend?
73 There certainly is resistance in some 
powerful parts of Japan to further financial liberalization, especially as it would compel closures 
of some politically connected businesses and rising unemployment transitionally. The pace of 
implementing agreed upon liberalization is also up for grabs, and the reluctance to decisively deal 
with the current banking crisis is widespread, even among advocates of banking reform. With 
regards to the US and IMF response to the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, Japan and many of 
its neighbors feel abused or ignored by American policymakers and by financial markets. To the 
extent that advocacy of financial liberalization is seen as American triumphalism, disregarding 
the earlier success stories of Asian growth, and is conflated with acknowledged IMF mistakes in 
the handling of specific structural adjustment programs or in sequencing capital account 
liberalization, there is the potential for intellectual counterarguments. In the United States, there 
are critics as well. Some “public interest” NGOs are committed to opposing globalization, for 
ideological or cynical reasons. “Japan-bashers” are alive and well in the US Congress, very 
concerned about the bilateral trade deficit, about US market access in specific industries, and 
about the protection of constituent businesses and workers. Between these two is the potential for 
an alliance against exporting the American financial model and American FDI to Japan. 
Yet I believe that these forces for backlash are unlikely to win out over the basic 
economic factors at work. As analyzed in Posen,
74 the Japanese government faces an imminent 
choice between managing a controlled implosion of its financial system or outright financial 
crisis. A controlled implosion would entail announcing and enforcing a write-off of the 15-20 
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percent of GDP in bad loans currently held by the Japanese banking system; recognizing that 
numerous bankruptcies of SMEs will result; shutting down or consolidating undercapitalized 
banks; recapitalizing those that remain; and selling off the accumulated collateral (mostly real 
estate) from defaulted borrowers
75 — in short, a radical shrinking of the Japanese banking system 
with convergence on the US model. As described above, the primary problem with Japanese 
banking has been the inability to force banks to exit as most good borrowers and some savers 
have left the system. Until exit is forced, the bad loans problem and the low returns to capital 
throughout the Japanese economy, as well as the drag on consumption from uncertainties about 
asset prices and job security, will persist.
76 Alternatively, an outright financial crisis in Japan 
would mean noticeable capital flight, a sharp decline in the value of the yen and of Japanese 
financial assets, the removal of savings and capital from the Japanese banking system, and spiral 
downwards in Japanese investment and growth difficult to arrest.
77 
The alternative of muddling through is no longer available to the Japanese government 
precisely because of the partial financial deregulation and international capital market integration 
they have already undertaken. There simply is too much American and liquid Japanese capital 
ready to leave Japan quickly should returns collapse or financial transparency be reversed. In fact, 
the Japanese government has set up its own deadline by its commitment to enforcing mark-to-
market accounting on the banks for the half-fiscal year ending September 30, 2001. This will 
conclusively reveal the extent of the banks’ capital losses and weak loan portfolios. Of course, the 
regulators could renege on this commitment, but such a renege would be so obvious and clearly 
motivated by fear that it might prompt the very crisis they are trying to avoid. It is possible that 
through extreme creativity by Japanese policymakers, or more likely through the extreme 
passivity of Japanese savers, the time might be pushed back another few months. Still, that would 
only open up further the gap between returns accruing to Japanese savers and the higher returns 
with lower risks in the United States and elsewhere. Somehow this would be arbitraged, unless 
the Japanese government further ramps up its public debt to make up the difference, but that too 
would likely provoke a financial crisis through a fiscal channel.  
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No matter how and when exactly such a financial crisis hits Japan in the next couple years, 
it will force the inward FDI, if not the outright leveraged buyout, of the Japanese financial sector 
by American capital and financial management. There will be no one else with the money, the 
skills, or the appetite for risk to salvage the system – and the assets of Japan will be available in a 
fire sale. So either by choice, or by crisis, Japan will complete its financial convergence upon the 
US model, with all the long-term effects to ease tensions and decentralize foreign policy 
decisions in the US-Japan economic arena discussed here. Unfortunately, if the transition to that 
situation of congruence is made through a Japanese financial crisis, the spillovers on the security 
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Figure 4: Net sale of US Treasuries by Japan
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